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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction to the project 
 
Recent events in and around the Horn of Africa region have again brought the political 
situation in Somalia to the forefront of media attention. The ongoing famine in the region has 
allegedly affected more than 11 million people and according to United Nations estimates 
could result in the deaths of 750 000 people if there is no significant international response 
(BBC 2011). Kenya’s crossing of the Somali border, and involvement in fighting the Islamist 
Al-Shabaab militias has deteriorated from a blitzkrieg operation into a protracted, slowly 
advancing campaign (lasting over 2 months now), taking a significant financial toll on the 
country (Oluoch 2011). Add to this the ongoing pirate activities off the coast of Somalia and it 
is easy to understand why Somalia has again become a popular topic for international media 
outlets. 
 
The ongoing famine in south and central Somalia has also brought attention to the lack of 
national political unity in Somalia, or better said the omnipresent political anarchy. It is not 
difficult to read, in many media outlets or journalistic analyses, how the country remains an 
endless pit of local fiefdoms and warlordism, or how it is “observing the 20th anniversary of 
civil conflicts” (Warsameh 2011). Over the past twenty years, Somalia has moved or “slid” as 
journalists are fond of saying, in and out of anarchy endless times (The Seattle Times 2003; 
The Irish Times 2007). Indeed, for anyone not well acquainted with Somali affairs, it is 
almost impossible to develop any idea of what the country must be like other than that of a 
hopeless, chaotic, and anarchic place, the problems of which are reinforced by endless famine.  
 
However, notwithstanding all the problems people in Somali have endured in the past twenty 
years (the endless civil strife, roaming militias, warlord politics, and drought and famine), life 
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in Somalia still goes on. People still survive and live on in one of the most dangerous places 
on this planet, and all this leads to several questions. If this place is so anarchic, chaotic, and 
unlivable, how is it that people still survive? Who provides security in local communities, or 
is everyone prey to roaming bands of militias? How do people find food, and how do they do 
business? 
 
When one digs further beneath the surface of the matter, abandoning shallow journalistic 
analyses and news bulletins, one is faced with a far more complex and actually hope inspiring 
image of Somalia. The quote in the title of this project “It is chaotic, but not chaos” is taken 
from an article written by one of those people who have dug deep beneath the surface and 
found that the situation in Somalia is not as simple and hopeless as is often portrayed. 
Professor Ken Menkhaus has written widely on Somali issues for the past twenty years, and 
has done a great service to the scholarship on Somalia by exposing latent, fluid, and nascent 
processes of governance in the country which have taken significant hold on the local level 
since the mid 1990s. With this in mind, this project seeks to examine some of the above raised 
questions and discuss how individuals, community initiatives, and civil society groups in the 
country contribute to the restoration of order at the local level. 
 
The guiding idea and leitmotif for this whole project is that when faced with state collapse, 
security chaos, and political anarchy, people are more resilient and less passive than most of 
us would expect, and they organize themselves in which ever way possible to bring about 
some order in their everyday lives. While the situation in much of Somalia is dangerous and 
often very violent, even crime and predatory rule can not be sustained in an environment of 
complete anarchy. Some sort of order and governance is constructed on the local level even 
in the most chaotic places in Somalia, and in the mid 1990s, only a few years after the worst 
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of the anarchic violence in the country had been seen, Ken Menkhaus stated that Somalia was 
“chaotic, but not chaos. It is a society without a state, but not, as is so often reported, 
“anarchy.”” (1995, 22). 
 
1.2 Assumptions 
 
These are some initial assumptions about the situation in Somalia which will be discussed in 
relevant chapters of the project: 
 
o There is no efficient and central state apparatus in Somalia  
o Attempts so far at developing a centralized government have been externally backed 
and financed, and do not necessarily represent the views and political allegiances of 
the population living in Somalia 
o Local modes of civil participation have more legitimacy and project more authority 
amongst the local populations 
o However chaotic the situation may seem, local networks of governance do exist, and 
the situation in Somalia is not that of complete anarchy 
o There are non-state (or sub-state) civil society-influenced political structures within 
Somalia that govern local communities  
o Economic activity in Somalia has actually benefited from a lack of centralized state 
 
1.3 Research question 
 
The main research question for the project is: 
“How do local communities and civil society actors construct and maintain political order, 
governance, and security at the local level in parts of south and central Somalia, and what 
is the basis for economic activity in these areas?” 
 
Answering this research question will be made easier by examining some sub-questions: 
o What constitutes a collapsed state, and does Somalia fit that definition? 
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o What constitutes civil society in Somalia? 
o What is the legal basis for local political order and governance structures in Somalia? 
o Who provides for local security and order in Somali communities? 
o What is the basis for economic activity in Somalia, and how is that activity fostered? 
o Have Somalis actually benefitted from a lack of state in terms of development and 
economic activity?  
 
1.4 Delimitations 
 
The first important delimitation is that this project is focused only on the region of south and 
central Somalia, and will not discuss the northern and north-western areas of Somaliland and 
Puntland.  
 
There are several reasons for this delimitation. The main reason is the distinctively different 
dynamic of governance in Somaliland and Puntland: Somaliland is de facto an autonomous 
state without international recognition but enjoying a high degree of local and regional 
sovereignty, and Puntland is a semi-autonomous state-like polity; as such these two areas fall 
outside of the main focus of this paper, which is concerned with life in a stateless 
environment. Also, the two areas are home to very different local governance structures 
which enjoy regional legitimacy and jurisdiction, something that can not be said of local 
governance structures in south and central Somalia (save for the brief rule of the Union of 
Islamic Courts in 2006).1 Another reason for the delimitation is that economic activities in 
these two regions are undertaken in a different political and security environment and as such 
are difficult to compare with those undertaken in south and central Somalia. Finally, the page 
                                                 
1 Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991 (Somaliland Constitution, Preamble), while Puntland 
was declared an autonomous province of Somalia in 1998 and forms part of the Federal Somali State (Puntland 
Constitution, Introduction). 
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limitations of this project do not permit an inclusion of Somaliland and Puntland because it 
would merit a much larger analysis and discussion. 
 
Temporally, this project is set on examining the timeframe of 1991 (the fall of the Siyad 
Barre regime and complete collapse of the Somali state) to roughly 2009. Recent 
developments on the ground in Somalia will not be examined but will only be given 
reference to where such reference is required. Political developments and the fight between 
the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and the African Union 
Mission in Somalia on the one hand, and various militias and Al-Shabaab forces on the other 
fall beyond the scope of this project. 
 
Finally, the last delimitation concerns the subject matter of the project. Because of its major 
importance for the political, security, and economic situation in south and central Somalia, 
particular importance is given to the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu. Since much of the 
sourced information and literature used in this project is to a large extent concerned with 
Mogadishu, particular attention will be given to examinations of community initiatives in or 
around the city. While the focus on Mogadishu is merited by its importance for the security 
and economic prosperity of south and central Somalia, this focus is influenced by the 
available data and literature, not necessarily the desires of the author. 
 
1.5 Research methodology 
 
This paper utilizes a number of primary sources and empirical studies, such as reports and 
newspaper articles on Somali development, economic activities, or political issues. The 
project is written using primary empirical sources and case studies, and relevant secondary 
literature which examines case studies, but also offers interpretations and analyses of the 
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Also, the reason why this project is concerned with a case study is because the examination 
of Somali civil society activities in constructing political order and governance, and fostering 
economic activity in a collapsed state environment is an exceptional way of applying the 
theories of collapsed states and civil society to actual empirical findings. Therefore, 
understanding, for example, what constitutes a collapsed state and what constitutes civil 
society in a collapsed state environment will allow us to understand these issues in the 
Somali context, and apply that framework to the situation on the ground in south and central 
Somalia. 
 
1.6 Outline of the paper 
 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 sets out a theoretical framework for understanding 
state collapse and how it relates to Somalia, and examines the idea and role of civil society 
and how it can be understood in the Somali context. This chapter offers a theoretical 
background against which we can understand the analytical discussion of the role civil 
society actors play in developing local governance and maintaining security and order, and 
how this influences and fosters economic activities in south and central Somalia. 
 
Chapter 3 offers a brief historical and political background of Somalia from independence to 
the present day. This chapter does not offer an exhaustive, in-depth analysis of the political 
situation in the country, but rather outlines a background against which empirical 
contextualization is possible. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 are the main analytical parts of this project. Chapter 4 examines civil 
society as a governance structure in Somalia, and discusses how political order and 
governance are constructed and maintained at the local level in many communities in and 
 10 
around Mogadishu. Furthermore, this chapter examines the legal basis for local governance 
and then discusses the nexus between Sharia courts, militias, and local businessmen, and 
their significance for that governance. Chapter 5, on the other hand, is a continuation of this 
discussion, but with a slightly different focus. Here, the focus is on economic activities, and 
how people in south and central Somalia construct economic order and engage in business 
activities. This chapter discusses how business transactions are made and what local 
community-driven initiatives are important for economic activity in the country. Finally, the 
chapter also examines whether the people of Somalia may be actually better off stateless in 
terms of development and economic activity. 
 
Chapter 6 is the conclusion chapter, and it offers a summary of the issues examined and 
discussed, and a reiteration of the main findings and arguments made in the analytical 
chapters. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
 
In order to lay out the theoretical framework for understanding the peculiarities of civil 
participation in Somalia, and to place the political, economic, and security situation in the 
country in the proper context, this section will discuss two issues: what is state collapse and 
how is it applicable to Somalia, and how we can define civil society and what it encompasses 
in the Somali context.  
 
2.1 Somalia and state collapse 
 
Over the past two decades the study of failing states or centralised regimes of power has 
received significant attention. Scholars of Social Sciences, and particularly International 
Relations and Security Studies have contributed to a great understanding and classification of 
failing and collapsed states and this brief examination of the issue will not offer an exhaustive 
analysis of the scholarship. What this section will do is outline a definition of collapsed states 
and explore what state collapse entails and how all of this is related to Somalia. 
 
According to Robert I. Rotberg, a scholar whose study of state collapse has done great service 
to scholarship on the topic, “Nation-States fail when they are consumed by internal violence 
and cease delivering positive political goods to their inhabitants” (Rotberg 2004, 1). While in 
his examination of state failure Rotberg distinguishes several forms of state disappearance 
such as weakness of the state, state failure, and state collapse, this is not of significant interest 
for the purposes of this chapter. What is of concern to us is Rotberg’s definition of a collapsed 
state: 
A collapsed [original emphasis] state is a rare and extreme version of a failed 
state. Political goods are obtained through private or ad hoc means. Security is 
equated with the rule of the strong. A collapsed state exhibits a vacuum of 
authority. It is a mere geographical expression, a black hole into which a 
failed polity has fallen (Rotberg 2004, 9). 
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A state can be failing for quite some time; “failing state” simply means that the state is 
failing to provide political goods, security, education, an environment conducive of economic 
activity, or health and social services to its population. In this regard, Somalia was a failing 
state for many years before its formal collapse in 1991. A collapsed state, on the other hand, 
has ceased to function in any shape or form, and there are no state structures left. This 
basically means that there is no national military, parliament, state bureaucracy, central bank, 
police force, or any other usual representation of state authority. 
 
While there may be academic dissent on the issue of failed vs. collapsed state, or whether it 
is at all useful to define a state as failed or collapsed, this issue will not be debated here. No 
matter what ideological or theoretical framework one accepts in dealing with a state which 
has lost all or most of its state-like characteristics and can not fund itself, provide security for 
its population, exert political influence over its territory, or keep its boundaries and therefore 
its sovereignty intact or protected, one should accept that such a political entity is no longer 
viable and indeed no longer exists. Therefore, in line with Rotberg’s argument that Somalia 
is indeed a collapsed state (Rotberg 2004, 11), this paper accepts that Somalia as a political 
entity with national and international sovereignty no longer exists, and as such constitutes a 
collapsed state. What we should do now is examine what state collapse actually means for 
the people living on the territory of the previous Somali state. 
 
We may imagine that in an environment of state failure and then state collapse, life for the 
majority of the state’s population would generally become even more difficult. However, 
when this state failure happens over a prolonged period in a significantly repressive state 
regime such as that of the Somali dictator Siyad Barre, the difference between a failed and 
collapsed state might not be that easy to spot. In any case, there are certain factors which 
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make life in such places extremely difficult. Firstly, as the political, security and economic 
situation in a state significantly deteriorates, life itself becomes less predictable; there is great 
internal displacement of people influencing the availability of resources; markets are 
disrupted and infrastructure decays; money supply balloons causing inflation and distortions 
in the fiscal system; state institutions are weakened or completely non-functional and crime 
levels rise considerably; and while all of this leads to massive human capital depletion and 
migration, the population of the country generally keeps growing, causing an even greater 
stress on already limited resources (Snodgrass 2004, 257-259). Usually, the Gross Domestic 
Product of failing states declines as well, which can be either a cause or effect of the above 
mentioned issues. 
 
We can argue that the collapsed state of Somalia went through a prolonged period of state 
failure going back to at least the mid 1980s (Menkhaus 2006, 80). As Menkhaus insightfully 
argues, with the exception of the security apparatus, most Somali government institutions 
began to atrophy following the disastrous Ogaden War (1977-78): the public school system 
crumbled, production on state-run facilities such as farms and factories plummeted, and the 
massive state bureaucracy was not much more than a dysfunctional structure of cronyism 
(Ibid.). The state was internally mostly concerned with repression and expropriation, the 
domination of political opponents, and security for the regime. Externally, it was quickly 
losing its international military backing, and from the 1990s onwards became a major 
international aid destination. Indeed, the Somali state towards the end of the 1980s did not 
provide much for the majority of its citizens, significant numbers of which were internally 
displaced, fighting in anti-government militias, or actively looking to migrate to safer 
countries. 
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Therefore, in summary, we can state that Somalia as a political entity constructed as a state no 
longer exists and has completely collapsed since 1991. There is currently no central 
government in the country, and this has been the case for the past 20 years. What this means 
in practice is that the majority of the Somali population have had to develop strategies and 
ways in which they can obtain the necessities needed for survival. People in Somalia can 
generally not count on anyone but themselves in finding and delivering essential economic 
and political goods, and as will be argued later, this has given rise to a multiplicity of local 
initiatives aimed at restoring some degree of economic and political order in much of the 
country. 
 
2.2 How to understand civic participation and civil society in the Somali context
2
 
 
It should be noted from the outset that the focus of this project is mostly concerned with 
participation of individuals or groups of people in overcoming the anarchy and chaos that 
state failure and collapse bring, and not necessarily with civil society in an organised, 
institutionalised bureaucratic sense. Therefore the idea of individual or group participation 
(regardless of whether this participation is aimed to benefit the wider population or only a 
selected few) must be discussed so as to develop a framework for understanding why such 
civil participative initiatives can be placed in the wider context of civil society.  
 
The term “civil society” means different things to different people and its conceptual 
universality is far from settled. One of the world’s largest multilateral donors of civil society, 
the World Bank uses the term to 
Refer to the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit 
organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and 
                                                 
2 I use the term “civic” and “civil” interchangeably because for the purposes of this project it denotes the same 
thing — participation by individuals or groups of people who are not members of state structures such as the 
military or police, and whose activities are aimed at developing economic or political order in a country. These 
people can, amongst others, include businessmen, voluntary groups of professionals, religious or clan based 
militias, or community based groups. 
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values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, 
scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of organizations: 
community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, 
indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, 
professional associations, and foundations (World Bank 2010). 
 
However, what the World Bank has adopted as its definition of civil society need not 
represent all aspects of civil society. In fact, the above outlined definition is highly selective 
because it explicitly talks about a “civil society organisation”, therefore, a rather formal and 
institutionalised type of civil society. This definition only refers to organised and structured 
formal civil society which is generally applicable to civil society movements in the developed 
world and only some non-governmental and faith-based organizations operating in the 
developing world. 
 
While the World Bank’s definition and explicit emphasis on organised civil society is 
understandable from a funding point of view, not all civil society movements, including civic 
participation initiatives, are formal and highly institutionalised. Indeed, not all civic 
participatory initiatives have administrative backing or an organised structure.  As Marina 
Ottaway argues discussing such donor definitions of civil society organisations, 
The aid agencies’ definition of civil society is further narrowed by their 
administrative requirements. The groups must be organised in a formal way 
because donors cannot provide support for an organisation that is not 
registered in some way, that does not have a name and address, or that 
cannot be audited. Informal networks or vaguely organised civic movements 
may play an important part in a society or a democratic transition, but they 
do not meet donors’ needs…(Ottaway 2008, 170). 
 
Therefore, we may infer that part of the reason why definitions of civil society can be so 
narrow and formal is because of what donors and aid agencies are looking for in civil society.  
 
Because such narrow definitions of civil society do not capture all forms of civic participation 
this project is not primarily concerned with highly organised, formal, and institutionalised 
civil society movements, but rather with civil participation and economic, security, and 
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political initiatives undertaken by individuals and groups aimed at restoring some sort of order 
in a community. In line with this argument we turn to an examination of more informal, and 
in the context of Somalia, more applicable forms of civil participation. 
 
As Howell and Lund, writing on civil society in Afghanistan argue “civil society is a 
contested concept, not least because of its diverse normative meanings, its vast empirical 
scope and its ideological appropriation by various actors” (2009, 719). Howell and Lund use 
the term to refer to the arena of collective action around shared interests and values that is 
distinct from the state, family and market, while at the same time noting that the boundaries 
between these three areas are in practice often blurred and complex (Ibid.). This is a very 
broad and relatively neutral definition of civil society and one which allows us to include 
various forms of civic participation into the theoretical framework of civil society. 
 
In 1998, in a very influential article examining modern civil society in the post-colonial 
context, Partha Chatterjee asked “how are we to conceptualize the rest of society that lies 
outside the domain of modern civil society?” (1998, 61). Arguing that this is mostly done 
through the modern/traditional civil society dichotomy, Chatterjee offered the option of 
political society as a concept which could be more illuminating. While the overall focus of 
Chatterjee’s discussion was different from that of this project, his question remains pertinent 
nevertheless. In south and central Somalia, in the absence of state structures and central 
authority, perhaps it would be wrong to state that Somali political society lies somewhere 
between civil society and the state (since there is no state to speak of). However, it would also 
be wrong to completely dismiss the idea that political society exists in Somalia even in the 
absence of a state. Political society denotes certain groups and their initiatives undertaken in 
order to exert some political influence in society. It does not necessarily mean that this 
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political influence needs to be exerted against the state; it can also be exerted against non-state 
actors who wield political power in a community. In the context of Somalia we can state that 
civic initiatives aimed at establishing some sort of political order and authority can be a form 
of political society. Although this process may very well be different from anything 
encountered so far, its novelty should not negate its existence.  
 
In order to understand how Somali people overcome everyday political, security, and 
economic impediments we must allow for an informal, loosely structured, and not necessarily 
highly organized civil society. This is not to say that there are no formal or organised and 
institutionalised civil society organisations operating in Somalia, but rather that if we do not 
adopt a wider focus of examining civil society we will fail to recognise and benefit from an 
understanding of complex, loosely organised and highly localised networks of civil society. 
While it is common for donors and aid agencies to lament on the weakness or even complete 
lack of civil society in countries where they are trying to promote democracy or deliver food 
aid, their judgement should not always be taken as valid. Ottaway rightly points out that 
“Paradoxically, in the countries where civil society is deemed at its weakest, for example in 
war-torn African countries, the population relies for survival on civil society networks that go 
well beyond the family and reveal a high degree of sophistication and organization” (Ottaway 
2008, 171). She argues that in addition to the formal, NGO type of civil society, there is also 
“traditional” civil society. This traditional civil society “is organised more informally, often 
through networks rather than formally structured organizations, and often following patterns 
that existed in earlier times”; for example along clan, ethnic, religious, or community lines 
(Ibid.).This informal and network based civil participation is exactly the kind of civil society 
operating in many parts of Somalia. 
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In a more modern and rather organizational view of civil society Neera Chandhoke has argued 
that “we hardly expect to find a civil society in countries like Afghanistan and Somalia where 
the state itself leads a precarious existence as a result of civil wars that have wrecked their 
countries and their politics” (quoted in Winters 2010, 15). However, it is exactly this 
environment of a weak or non-existent state structure that has allowed loosely structure, 
informal, and traditional civil society movements to grow strong.  
 
Writing on civil society and the reconstruction of failed states, Daniel Posner has 
distinguished two models of civil society activity: “advocacy” and “substitution“(2004, 238). 
While the former model is concerned with keeping state activities in check, the latter basically 
provides services the state is incapable of providing. As Posner argues, in such situations 
where civil society substitutes state obligations “neighborhood watch groups compensate for 
the absence of police protection…Rotating credit associations make up for the lack of state-
sponsored credit…Clan elders substitute for weak or corrupt courts…Community 
organizations compensate for the lack of state-provided public services” (Ibid., 239). Posner’s 
exposition is very relevant in understanding the activities of civic participation in Somalia. In 
the words of Marina Ottaway “In countries where the state is strong, traditional civil society is 
weak and modern civil society is strong. If the state is weak, so is modern civil society but 
traditional civil society is strong” (2008, 171-172). Therefore in the context of Somalia we 
can argue that the activities of the people of Somalia aimed at developing economic and 
political order are the actions of a less formal but nevertheless strong civil society movement. 
After all, some scholars have argued that “there is little support for arguments that the civil 
society concept is culturally alien to non-Western societies” and that “both the concept and 
the actually existing forms of civil society are evolving and adapting in ways that are both 
diverse and unpredictable” (Glasius et al., 2004, 7). This unpredictability of civil society 
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evolution means that we can not judge civil society movements according to only one format 
or pattern. 
 
2.3 Section conclusion 
 
Somalia has in the past two decades witnessed numerous community, religious, or clan led 
initiatives aimed at peace negotiations, establishing local or regional governance structures, 
protecting property and people’s lives, and ultimately leading to the establishment of some 
sort of governance and order. The purpose of this report is to examine some of these 
initiatives and discuss their importance for the local populace. In line with the arguments 
presented above, this report sees civil society as any form of civilian or non-state actor 
participation in society aimed at overcoming economic, security, and political anarchy. This 
does not necessarily imply that all civil society initiatives are benign or positive for the 
majority of the population, as militias and organised crime groups are also a component of 
civic participation and civil society. However, such components of civil society are only one 
arm of civic activity and in the context of this project will be examined only when acting as a 
means of community led initiatives aimed at providing security and order for the local 
population. 
 
To sum up, the current study of Somali civil participation adopts a wide, neutral, and 
inclusive approach to the study of civil society. This civil society may include modern, formal 
and organised institutions, but it may also include informal, network based, traditional, and 
local modes of civil participation. This section has attempted to examine and discuss a 
theoretical framework which will allow a greater understanding of civil participation in 
Somalia, and which accepts that Somali civil society may have developed in ways and 
directions of its own. The following section will offer a brief historical overview of major 
Somali political developments from independence onwards which will provide a historical 
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background and context against which the current discussion of Somalia should be 
understood. 
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3. Historical and political background on Somalia 
 
3.1 Somalia after independence and under Siyad Barre’s rule 
 
Unlike many other African countries, Somalia upon independence actually enjoyed a 
significant sense of national identity. In July 1960, after some 70 years of European 
domination and overlordship, and upon the merger of British Somaliland and Italian Somalia, 
the new Republic of Somalia was proclaimed (Meredith 2006, 465). However, it should be 
noted straight from the outset that ethnic Somalis inhabited significant areas outside of 
Somalia’s formal borders. Kenya’s Northern District, Djibouti, and the Ogaden region of 
eastern Ethiopia were then home to some 4 million Somalis (Ibid.). 
 
The reason why Somalia is considered to have a strong national identity is because its 
population is seemingly very cohesive: Somalis share a common culture based on folk 
traditions, a pastoralist way of life, common language, and common religion (Sunni Islam) 
(Clarke and Gosende 2003, 132; Lewis 2004, 492). Furthermore, most of the population 
recognises and draws ancestry from one of the five main Somali clans: Hawiye, Darod, Issaq, 
Dir, and Digil-Mirifle. These clans are further subdivided into sub-clan groups and extended 
families. What is important for any student of Somali politics and history is to recognise the 
significance clan structures have for the Somali population and political circumstances in the 
country. Clan structures predate the Somali state and as Lewis concludes “the genealogies 
embodying the invisible force of clanship are, therefore, in effect genetic guidelines for the 
social and political interactions of those whose descent they record” (2004, 491). 
 
During the first 9 years of Somali independence, the country was ruled by a civilian 
government which “proved to be experimental, inefficient, corrupt, and incapable of creating 
any kind of national political culture” (Clarke and Gosende 2003, 133). Then, in October 
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1969, a coup led by General Mohamed Siyad Barre suspended the constitution. Barre imposed 
authoritarian socialist rule in the country maintaining strong ties to the Soviet Union, which 
allowed Somalia to build one of Africa’s strongest standing armies. Initially, when Barre 
seized power he was greeted with broad public support. He projected himself as a 
“modernist”, banned all clan-based organizations, and nourished Somalia’s dream of unifying 
all Somali territories. While the period of Barre’s first 7 years in power was relatively 
peaceful (his regime concentrated mostly on local development and consolidation of its 
authority), what followed would sow the seeds of discontent amongst Somalis for years to 
come. 
 
Between 1977 and 1991, Somalia suffered three major armed conflicts. The first one, the 
Ogaden War, was fought against Ethiopia in 1977-1978. In an attempt to realize the dream of 
the unification of Greater Somalia, Barre’s forces intervened in support of Somali rebel 
fighters (Western Somali Liberation Front) to expel Ethiopians from ethnic Somali territory in 
the region of Ogaden. Unfortunately for Barre, his patrons in the Soviet Union decided to 
switch sides in the midst of the war, and utilizing a massive airlift effort transported Cuban 
military personnel from Angola to Ethiopia while supporting the Ethiopians with military aid. 
Although in September 1977 controlling some 90% of the Ogaden region, by March 1978 
Somali forces were forced to withdraw almost completely from the Ogaden (Clarke and 
Gosende 2003, 136).  
 
This loss was not only devastating militarily, but also laid the foundation for future internal 
conflict and the further strengthening of clan-based structures within Somali society. A coup 
was attempted against Barre in April 1978, after which Barre abandoned any semblance of 
governing without considerations of clan allegiance and executed all but one of the coup 
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plotters (the one that got away established an anti-Barre opposition group in Ethiopia). In 
1981 Issaq expatriates in London founded the Somali National Movement (SNM) with the 
goal of ridding Somalia of Siyad Barre (Clarke and Gosende 2003, 136). 
 
The establishment of the SNM leads us to the second major armed conflict the country 
suffered, that between the SNM and the Somali military. This conflict was fought mostly in 
the north-west of the country, the area roughly corresponding to today’s autonomous region 
of Somaliland. The SNM was dominated by members of the northern-based Issaq clan and in 
1988 mounted a military campaign against Barre capturing Somalia’s second largest town, 
Hargeisa.  
 
After the defeat in the Ogaden War and during the 1980s Barre developed a strong Anti-
Soviet stance, which resulted in high levels of aid from the Western world. During the 1980s 
Italy provided Somalia with $1 billion in aid, half of it in military supplies, while the US 
supplied some $800 million worth of aid, one-quarter in military assistance (Meredith 2006, 
468). 
 
As a result of Barre’s substantial military capabilities and foreign support, the war against the 
SNM was exceptionally devastating for the north of Somalia. Hargeisa was bombarded 
heavily and almost completely destroyed. Thousands of civilians were killed and a testament 
to the senselessness of the killing was a rebellion by Somali air force pilots who declined to 
further slaughter fellow citizens and defected with their aircrafts to neighboring Ethiopia 
(Clarke and Gosende 2003, 137). The civil war was disastrous for northern Somalia: more 
than 300 000 Issaq refugees fled into Ethiopia, while another half a million fled to other parts 
of Somalia (Ibid.). Barre’s horrendous repression of the SNM and killing of many civilians 
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became one of the main reasons why the Issaq dominated north-west of Somalia seceded from 
the rest of the country in 1991. 
 
The third major armed conflict in Somalia prior to 1991 pitted Barre’s armed forces against a 
growing number of clan-based liberation movements in 1989 and 1990. This conflict marked 
the end of Barre’s hold on power, who by the end of 1990 scarcely controlled anything 
outside the capital Mogadishu and was derisively called “the Mayor of Mogadishu” (Meredith 
2006, 469). However, the expulsion of Barre in January 1991 was not followed by a 
replacement government, but instead by a long period of violent warfare, looting, and general 
anarchy. As Menkhaus has argued the Barre regime’s “divide-and-rule tactics stoked deep 
interclan animosities and distrust, and are held partially responsible for the failure of clans to 
unite in a post-Barre government” (Menkhaus 2006, 80). 
 
3.2 Somalia after 1991 
 
Armed conflict raged across southern Somalia throughout 1991-1992 as clan-based militias 
fought each other for control of resources in various towns and ports. The post-Barre war 
which may have begun as a struggle for control of the government, quickly turned into 
predatory looting and banditry by various militias. Towards 1992 Somalia was affected by a 
massive famine, and the casualties of the fighting and famine combined are estimated at 250 
000 Somali deaths (Menkhaus 2006, 81). The international food aid sent to alleviate the 
famine quickly became part of the war economy (a commodity worth fighting over). 
However, what should be remembered is that in contrast to events unfolding in the south of 
Somalia, the northern regions of the country did not suffer such large-scale warfare and 
devastating plunder and famine.  
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In response to the widely media covered and significantly devastating famine, and the 
inability of the food aid to reach its intended recipients safely, the UN and US intervened in 
Somalia with a view to protecting the food aid and helping the famine ravaged southern 
Somalia. There is no need here for a detailed outline of this intervention. The history of this 
period is amply documented in numerous books and articles. Suffice it to say that the UN and 
US were not successful in building any sort of consensus between the warring militias, or 
forming a peace-deal. After the infamous and highly publicized 1993 “Black Hawk Down” 
incident in which Somali militias managed to shoot down two US helicopters and kill 18 US 
soldiers, the US had had enough of Somalia. Soon after the March 1994 withdrawal of all US 
troops from Somalia, the UN followed suit, leaving the country at the mercy of its own 
warring parties and clan supported militias (Clarke and Gosende 2003, 143-145).  
 
Since 1995, armed conflict has continued to plague southern and central Somalia, but the 
nature of the conflict has changed. From 1995 to 2006 the majority of armed conflicts in the 
country occurred locally pitting subclans against one another, and it should be remembered 
that the duration and intensity of these conflicts is diverse, leaving the situation across the 
country far from uniform (Menkhaus 2006, 88). The most peaceful and relatively secure area 
remains the secessionist state of Somaliland in the north. In the north-east, Puntland has 
developed a semi-autonomous state-like structure which allows it to foster a more secure and 
peaceful environment than that in central and southern Somalia (Menkhaus 2006, 83). 
Unfortunately, since 2008 Puntland has come under significant international attention due to 
the problems of piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden.  However, the piracy 
problem does nota appear to be a significantly destabilizing problem for Puntland authorities, 
rather it is a significant nuisance and threat to international shipping companies, and 
individuals sailing in those areas. 
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Even in southern Somalia there have been slight improvements in local systems of 
governance. In certain areas local polities, generally comprised of Sharia courts, have sprung 
up, providing some amount of law and order to the population (more extensively discussed in 
Chapter 4). Some of these Sharia courts later became springboards for radical Islamist 
movements (Menkhaus 2006, 86), and a cooperation of such Islamic Courts (the Union of 
Islamic Courts) temporarily controlled most of south and central Somalia throughout 2006, 
before the country was invaded by the Ethiopian army. What sprung up from the remnants of 
the Union of Islamic Courts, and is currently in control of large parts of southern Somalia is 
the loosely affiliated Al-Shabaab group. This affiliation of militias and clan-groups is 
designated as a terrorist group by the US and other Western governments because of its 
supposed links to Al-Qaeda (Al Jazerra 2011). 
 
Although Somalia remains without a functional central government, there are international 
efforts to create one. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia is the 
internationally backed and recognized government of Somalia, and is currently headed by 
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the former commander of the Union of Islamic Courts. The TFG is 
heavily supported by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) military forces, and 
currently controls 90% of Mogadishu (United Nations 2011, 4, par.15). The recent Kenyan 
military intervention against Al-Shabaab strongholds in the south of Somalia has the potential 
to further weaken the Islamist militias and aid the TFG in extending its authority outside of 
Mogadishu. 
 
3.3 Section conclusion 
 
To sum up, since 1991, and especially in the past decade and half, large parts of Somalia have 
been characterized by political anarchy, grave insecurity and significant lack of any sort of 
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trans-local governance. However, this period has also witnessed a rise in informal systems of 
security and governance in response to the prolonged absence of a functional central 
government. It is argued that this development has been driven by the evolving role of 
coalitions of various business groups, traditional authorities and civic groups in promoting 
stateless forms of public order and rule of law (Menkhaus 2006). These stateless forms of 
public governance, or governance without government, especially in the spheres of local 
security and economic activity, are the key focus of this project and will be further examined 
in the following two chapters. 
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4. Civil Society as a governance structure: constructing political 
order and maintaining local security in south and central Somalia 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In an often cited article titled “The Coming Anarchy” written in 1994, the United States 
journalist Robert D. Kaplan clearly and forcefully argued that the coming collapse of central 
state authority in West Africa, and much of the developing world, would inevitably give rise 
to anarchy, societal breakdown, and crime and violence. Amongst many other questionable 
conclusions, Kaplan argued that 
Africa's immediate future could be very bad. The coming upheaval, in which 
foreign embassies are shut down, states collapse, and contact with the outside 
world takes place through dangerous, disease-ridden coastal trading posts, will 
loom large in the century we are entering…Precisely because much of Africa is 
set to go over the edge at a time when the Cold War has ended, when 
environmental and demographic stress in other parts of the globe is becoming 
critical, and when the post-First World War system of nation-states—not just in 
the Balkans but perhaps also in the Middle East—is about to be toppled, Africa 
suggests what war, borders, and ethnic politics will be like a few decades hence. 
 
 
Although Kaplan’s alarmist and fatalist views of the apocalyptic “Mad Max-like” future have 
not, for the most part, come true, his ideas of state collapse inevitably leading to anarchy and 
unprecedented levels of crime and violence are still highly influential for many who view 
states as the ultimate and only legitimate politico-societal structure available to mankind. 
While failing states, violence and anarchy are very popular topics for media outlets, state 
collapse does not necessarily imply endless anarchy. Thankfully, scholars such as Ken 
Menkhaus have argued that particularly in the case of Somalia, views such as those 
expressed by Kaplan should be questioned.  
 
Menkhaus has argued that “Somalia shows that local communities in Africa have proved 
more resilient, more politically innovative, and less passive in the face of a crisis of 
governance that Kaplan and others have assumed” (1998, 220). Somalia is a case of a 
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collapsed state which does not necessarily fit into Kaplan’s clear-cut presentation of anarchic 
and order-less black spots where society has completely broken down. In fact, Somalia 
exhibits strong aspects of local community activity and bottom-up societal development, 
where local people have managed to devise structures of governance (even if with only local 
and limited jurisdiction). Somalia is, in Menkhaus’ words “without government but not 
without governance” (2006, 82). 
 
The following discussion will explore in more detail Menkhaus’ argument, and examine how 
Somali non-state actors (its civil society and citizens) have managed to construct political 
order at the local level. 
 
4.2 Local governance in a stateless environment: What is the legal basis for local 
governance in Somalia? 
 
In 1998 Ken Menkhaus reiterated his arguments about Somali statelessness and anarchy 
and argued that  
While Somalia today is stateless, it is not anarchic. Although repeated efforts to 
revive a central government have failed, local communities have responded with a 
wide range of strategies to establish the minimal essential elements of 
governance. What has emerged in Somalia are fluid, localized polities involving 
authorities as diverse as clan elders, professionals, militia leaders, businessmen, 
traditional Muslim clerics, Islamic fundamentalists and women’s associations 
(1998, 220). 
 
All of the above mentioned actors constitute some form of civil society as outlined in 
Chapter 2: traditional civil society composed of clan elders and Muslim clerics; modern civil 
society made up of women’s associations, professionals, and businessmen; and political 
society made up of all of the above and Islamic fundamentalists and militia leaders. The 
question under discussion here will be which actors contribute to local governance in the 
spheres of politics and security, and what their basis for participation is. 
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There are two main foundations for local governance, or any kind of governance for that 
matter, in Somalia after the collapse of the state; Somali customary law (Xeer), and Sharia 
law.3 
 
Xeer is based on Somali customs and while it was replaced with Somali state legislation 
during the life of the Somali state, since its collapse, Xeer has again become the predominant 
legal system (Powell, Ford and Nowrasteh 2008, 666). Xeer is a customary law which 
outlaws crimes such as homicide, assault, rape, torture, kidnapping, robbery, theft, arson, 
property damage and other similar offences, and focuses on restitution (in kind) for victims 
and not the punishment of criminals (Ibid.). If individuals are unable to pay the proscribed 
compensation, their extended family must cover the amount. This is another key reason why 
clan affiliation is so important in Somalia. Xeer is judged by clan elders chosen for their 
knowledge of customs, but they only serve to interpret the community law, and can not 
invent legal precedents. 
 
Sharia, on the other hand, is Islamic law which guides many aspects of Muslim life including 
daily routines, familial and religious obligations, and financial dealings. It is derived 
primarily from the Quran and the Sunna (the sayings, practices, and teachings of the Prophet 
Mohammed). Precedents and analogy applied by Muslim scholars and clerics are used to 
address new issues, and importantly, the consensus of the Muslim community also plays a 
role in defining this theological manual (Johnson and Vriens 2011). This last point is quite 
important in the Somali context where Sharia courts are a major source of local governance, 
                                                 
3 This classification does not necessarily include Somaliland and Puntland, where state structures may exist in 
stronger form that in south and central Somalia, and as such may allow for a third legal basis for governance, 
namely state legislation. However, even such state legislation may be influenced by local customs, Xeer, or 
Sharia. 
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but there exists a tension between a fundamentalist and radical interpretation of Sharia and a 
more moderate one. 
 
As a result of these two systems of governance, those mostly found at the pinnacle of local 
governance are clan elders and Muslim clerics. Since Xeer is based on local custom, and the 
enforcement of Sharia law varies in different regions of Somalia, these two legal systems 
allow great flexibility for local Somali governance. For example, while Xeer outlaws 
homicide, torture, rape, abduction, robbery etc. and focuses on restitution for victims, its 
interpretation varies according to clan elders and local courts (Powell, Ford and Nowrasteh 
2008, 667). Similarly, Sharia courts are often set up by local communities with the help of 
local Muslim clergy, and different clerics may interpret certain aspects of Sharia differently, 
and with varying degrees of dogmatic zeal. 
 
In regards to the role played by clan elders and neighborhood community groups in 
maintaining order, it should be said that it is difficult to disentangle such initiatives from 
those under the umbrella of Sharia courts. That is to say, often clan elders and neighborhood 
communities work with Sharia courts in maintaining order,  rather than working 
independently of them. However, there are (or were) instances where local police forces or 
armed neighborhood groups provide security in local areas independently of Sharia courts. 
Neighborhood watch systems of collective security are in place in some urban areas of 
Somalia, and local or clan based militias can also serve as a protective service. On the other 
hand, clan elders often work long days hearing and managing disputes, arranging 
compensation for wrongs committed, and conducting quasi-diplomatic relations between 
clans (Menkhaus 1998, 223). Therefore, civil society in Somalia (in this case clan elders and 
local community initiatives) has been active and often successful in organizing local security 
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and providing some sort of order in a stateless society, and its success has been 
complemented by the development of Sharia courts.  
 
4.3 The nexus of Sharia courts, militias, and businessmen 
 
One of the most successfully civil society initiatives aimed at developing political order and 
stability in local communities has been the introduction of Sharia courts. As Ken Menkhaus 
argues, during the second half of the 1990s, “different types of local polities have emerged in 
Somalia, but the most common manifestation has been a coalition of clan elders, 
intellectuals, businesspeople, and Muslim clergy to oversee, finance, and administer a sharia 
court” (2006, 85). Although to citizens of liberal democratic regimes in Western Europe and 
North America the idea of Sharia courts might seem repugnant (amongst other things due to 
the perceived harshness of crime punishment); in the Somali context these courts have had 
significant success in providing order in a stateless society. What we should also not forget, 
and what is key for understanding the success of Sharia courts as local governance initiatives 
is that “they have the added advantage of enjoying a high degree of legitimacy and local 
ownership”, something that cannot always be said of top-down, foreign-backed state building 
and governance structures such as the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (Ibid., 
82).  
 
Sharia courts first emerged in northern Mogadishu in August 1994 (Mwangi 2010, 89). 
These early Sharia courts were local, clan based initiatives funded by local Muslim clerics or 
businessmen, and aimed at providing a degree or law, order and security in a stateless and 
anarchic situation. A typical court is composed of three elements; a shura (council), a 
chairman, and a military commander (Ibid.). The shura includes respected political, 
traditional, business and religious leaders from the clan, while the chairman is appointed by 
the shura and the military commander is in turn appointed by the chairman, subject to the 
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shura’s approval (Ibid.). The resources of these courts are usually derived from a 
combination of private contributions and taxation of various business and militia activities. 
 
The first generations of Sharia courts were widely popular. After years of protracted and 
bloody fighting in which families and clans suffered, local populations were displaced, and 
local businesses were held hostage to militia tax-levies and protection money, local Somali 
communities welcomed Sharia courts and supported them as a means of restoring the rule of 
law (Menkhaus 2006, 85). Since these courts were very local in jurisdiction and served 
specific sub-clans or local neighborhoods, Sharia courts offered local communities a strong 
and legitimate governance mechanism. Controlled by a coalition of clan elders, Islamic 
clerics, and local businessmen these early Islamic courts allowed the parties to choose 
between the application of Sharia or Xeer, and were moderate in nature and generally 
opposed to radical Islam (Ibid., 85-86). In fact, in some towns, such as Hargeisa, Borama, 
Luuq, and Merka, local polities have done more than just keep peace via a Sharia court. 
Some local municipalities have been able to provide certain basic services such as piped 
water, regulated marketplaces, and even levy small taxes. As with Sharia courts, such 
successful and effective local municipalities enjoy enormous popularity with local 
communities (Menkhaus 2004, 155). 
 
In understanding the full extent of Somali civil society as an alternative governance structure, 
we must also examine the role played by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Since the mid 
1990s Sharia courts were springing up all across Somalia, and by late 2005, eleven clan-
based Islamic courts were established in Mogadishu alone; some favoring radical Islam, 
others embodying a more traditional character (Mwangi 2010, 90).  Most of these courts 
were primarily concerned with security in their own areas of the capital, and even though 
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local in character, these courts did contribute troops and equipment to a combined UIC 
militia force of 400 members (Ibid.). What is important to remember in regards to the 
popularity of the Islamic courts with local communities is that their militias were formed by 
very religious and highly disciplined young men. They were a far cry from the parasitical and 
ill-disciplined groups of youngsters first controlled in the early 1990s by Mogadishu’s 
warlords, and then left to develop their own exploitative and criminal groups. As a more 
disciplined and often better equipped force, these Islamic court militias were able to 
successfully deal with security issues in their local spheres of influence, and when united 
under the UIC, formed an impressive fighting force. 
 
In June 2006, the UIC defeated the various clan based warlords who had effectively reigned 
over Mogadishu since the early 1990s, and restored a high degree of peace to the capital; a 
feat neither the warlords nor the internationally backed Transitional Federal Government 
were capable of. For the first time since the collapse of the Somali state an organization 
managed to unite Mogadishu and deliver peace and security to its population. Furthermore, 
as Mwangi states  
The courts undertook significant and highly symbolic public actions aimed at 
restoring peace, security and public confidence. These included, among others, 
the removal of unnecessary roadblocks, the removal of garbage that posed an 
environmental threat to the city, and the reopening and rehabilitation of 
Mogadishu’s main airport and seaport. Other actions included the removal of 
squatters from government buildings, curbing illegal land grabbing, the provision 
of militias for policing duties, and opening special courts to deal with the 
numerous claims for the restitution of property (2010, 91).  
 
In the example of the UIC, we can clearly see a process by which a civil society governance 
initiative (that of the local businessmen, clergy, and clan elders) at the local level, has been 
transformed to a regional governance structure, reminiscent of the state. In effect, the role the 
UIC played in establishing and maintaining security and order in much of south and central 
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Somalia in 2006 highlights Posner’s assertion about the dual role of civil society. As outlined 
in Chapter 2, Posner argued that civil society activity fits into two models; that of advocacy 
(keeping the state in check), and substitution (providing services the state is incapable of 
providing) (2004, 239). By defeating Mogadishu’s warlords and establishing security in the 
capital, the UIC basically provided services usually expected from the state. The UIC was 
effective in its activities, and enjoyed legitimacy and popularity with local populations for 
three main reasons: it improved security and law governance at the local level; proved to be 
an effective conflict resolution mechanism for factional clan leaders; and provided a secure 
environment for local businesses to operate profitably, and for economic activity to flourish 
(Mwangi 2010, 92). 
 
While the UIC was effective in combating and defeating local Mogadishu warlords, it was 
not the only force successfully combating the warlords. In a more subtle and less bloody way 
local businessmen in Mogadishu managed to disarm local militias and utilize them in 
providing for local security and political order. As Menkhaus observed 
The decision by leading Mogadishu businessmen in 1999 to refuse to pay taxes to 
warlords in their clans, to buy out the militiamen from beneath the warlords, and 
to support local sharia [original emphasis] courts in a bid to clean up street crime, 
was a watershed moment in southern Somalia. It was the point at which the 
economic interests of the business elite helped to reshape the political landscape 
(2004, 159). 
 
It was the economic interest of local Mogadishu businessmen that contributed to the creation 
of economic and political order in southern Somalia, which in turn has allowed locals to 
enjoy some semblance of a peaceful and ordered lifestyle. 
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4.4 Section conclusion 
 
Taking Ken Menkhaus’ comments about Somali governance without government as a 
guiding thought, the purpose of this chapter has been to examine how such governance has 
been constructed in south and central Somalia, and what role civil society and local 
community initiatives have played in it. The chapter established that the legal and most 
legitimate foundation for local governance accepted by local people is to be found in Somali 
customary law (Xeer), and Islamic law (Sharia). These two legal systems complement each 
other and allow local Somali communities great flexibility in designing a legal framework for 
local governance. 
 
Following this, the chapter examined the nexus between Sharia courts, local militias, and 
businessmen. An argument was made that Sharia courts have been developed by local 
communities as a means of developing political order and security, which in turn fostered 
economic activity. These courts have enjoyed a great degree of legitimacy and popularity 
with local populations, and we should always remember that Sharia courts were primarily a 
civil society initiative, both founded and funded by local communities. In this light, we 
should see the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) as a successful macrocosm of local Sharia 
courts. The UIC was highly successful and effective in establishing and maintaining order 
and security in large parts of Somalia, and its success should be seen as a result of the 
movement being a bottom-up initiative of local Somalis.  
 
Although some may be reluctant to credit the UIC with a positive role in developing order in 
south and central Somalia, we should keep in mind that “armed non-state actors play both a 
negative and positive role in security governance in collapsed states” (Mwangi 2010, 93). For 
the purpose of examining the role civil society initiatives play in developing order in the 
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absence of a centralized state regime, it is not so important whether the UIC’s later Islamic 
radicalization may have made life more difficult for local Somalis, or whether the movement 
ever developed links with Islamic terrorist organizations. What is important for our present 
discussion is that the UIC originated as a local civil society initiative aimed at restoring order 
and providing for security in local Somali communities, and that it enjoyed significant 
legitimacy and popularity in those local communities. 
 
What this chapter has attempted to highlight is that “in zones of war, criminal violence, and 
state collapse, the individuals and communities caught in these crises actively seek to reduce 
and manage risk, and are quick to fashion informal systems providing a modicum of security 
and predictability in their lives” (Menkhaus 2004, 163). We have argued that there is indeed, 
at the local level in Somalia, a somewhat complex system of governance without the 
presence of a government. As Ken Menkhaus has concluded “These extensive and intensive 
mechanisms for managing conflict and providing a very modest level of security in a context 
of state collapse are virtually invisible to external observers, whose sole preoccupation is 
usually with the one structure that historically provided the least amount of rule of law and 
the most amount of predation—the central state” (Ibid., 156). Just because the state-centric 
international community is unable or unwilling to understand that in Somalia there exists a 
multitude of bottom-up, locally initiated political and security governance structures, that 
does not necessarily imply that such initiatives hold no significance in the daily lives of the 
Somali people. It is exactly this locally driven political and security governance that has 
allowed economic activity in Somalia to strengthen, and the following chapter examines how 
economic order and activity in Somalia is maintained. 
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5. Doing business in a collapsed state: The bases for economic 
activity in Somalia 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The question of the Somali economy and economic activity in a collapsed state is a complex 
one. On the one hand, it is a reasonable assumption that the Somali economy has been 
severely adversely affected by the collapse of the state, and that this collapse has significantly 
impeded the creation of a business friendly environment. On the other hand, it is also 
reasonable to question whether the Somali state under Siyad Barre was in itself conducive of a 
friendly business environment, and whether that state, especially since the late 1980s, was 
more of a hindrance than a helping hand in fostering economic activity amongst the local 
population. Of the research that does exist on the Somali economy, development, and living 
standards post state collapse, a significant portion suggests that people living in Somalia today 
are not much worse off economically than during the time of the Somali state. 
 
Scholars such as Benjamin Powell, Ryan Ford, and Alex Nowrasteh argue that today, 
“statelessness seems to have generally improved living conditions in Somalia” (2008, 669). 
Others, such as Peter T. Leeson, generally concur arguing that “While it is important to avoid 
romanticizing Somalia, the results suggest that statelessness has substantially improved 
Somali development. I find that on nearly all indicators Somalia is doing significantly better 
under anarchy than it was under government” (2007, 692). In fact, as early as 1997, Jamil A. 
Mubarak wrote about the Somali economy: “Surprisingly, in some areas, the local economy is 
thriving and is experiencing an unparalleled economic boom raising the question of whether 
absence of government is a blessing in itself” (1997, 2027). On the basis of such conclusions 
we could argue that indeed Somali people have not been discouraged from undertaking 
economic investments and establishing economic order in the environment of state collapse 
and political uncertainty. 
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This chapter builds upon the ideas expressed in the previous one, namely that people in 
Somalia have not remained passive victims of anarchy and insecurity, but have been very 
active in establishing political order and security, and fostering economic activity. The 
chapter examines how Somali citizens participate in the local economy, and how local and 
transnational communities contribute to the maintenance of that economy.  
 
5.2 The business of Trust: Hawala, Hagbed, and the remittance economy 
 
When a state collapses and most vestiges of economic normalcy, such as banks and 
businesses, the minting and printing of money, or the local marketplace, begin to disappear in 
the oncoming conflict and anarchy accompanying political disorder, it is tempting to assume 
that political disorder and anarchy will lead to a complete shut-down of economic activity. 
However, the situation is not so simple, and when faced with such circumstances, people 
whose daily lives still endure must construct or fall back on certain systems of operation 
familiar and accepted by the community. 
 
In Somalia, such systems of operation in the economic sphere include the informal transfer of 
funds know as Hawala and the informal provision of credit know as Hagbed. Hawala is a 
basic and traditional Somali arrangement based solely on trust, where a person wishing to 
send money from one city in the world back to Somalia, approaches a Hawala agent in his/her 
city and gives this agent a lump sum of cash. Upon accepting the money and taking a 
commission (usually around 5%), the agent will contact his associate in Somalia and inform 
him that someone will come to collect a certain amount of money sent by a certain person 
from abroad. The money will only be released once the agent in Somalia has affirmed the 
identity of the would-be recipient and his/her connection to the money sender (Hesse 2010, 
345). The system works the same way as a formal, for example Western Union, transfer of 
funds, only without the formal bits such as identity documents, computer registration etc. The 
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same as in a Western Union money transfer, no actual physical money exchange takes place, 
which allows for such transfers to be executed rapidly. 
 
The importance of Hawala for the economic activities of local Somalis cannot be overstated. 
Hawala should not only be seen as a system of informal remittance transfer, but also as a 
payment option within the country. In a country where state financial institutions have ceased 
to exist, overall security is provided only locally, and travel for the sake of business can be a 
life-threatening activity, a system of informal economic fund transfer which most people 
recognize and utilize is a strong basis for all economic activity. The great fragmentation of 
economic activity in Somalia following the collapse of the state and ensuing political anarchy 
in the early 1990s has meant that all of those local individuals engaging in business have had 
to find a common informal understanding of how economic activities would operate. 
Shopkeepers have had to establish and coordinate how their goods would be delivered and 
how they would be paid for, transporters have had to determine how they will negotiate 
transportation of such goods through areas of political anarchy, and those engaged in local 
trade have had to find a common way of trading without endangering their reputation or 
suffering financial ruin. In all of these cases having an informal system of payment accepted 
by everyone is indispensible. 
 
Not withstanding all of the above outlined problems, businessmen in Somalia have managed 
to survive the worst of post state collapse anarchy, and are now reaping the benefits of locally 
owned activities aimed at establishing order and security in the country. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, businessmen in southern and central Somalia have for a long time now been 
involved with clan elders in establishing and running Sharia courts. Businessmen in 
Mogadishu have utilized their resources in demobilizing local militias and curtailing the 
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influence of local warlords by employing militias as their own security forces, or paying them 
to provide security for local communities. Furthermore, the fall of the oppressive state regime 
in 1991 actually helped strengthen local markets. For example, in Mogadishu, the small shops 
in the Bakaara market are home to hundreds of small businessmen who trade in foreign 
currencies, good and services (Mubarak 1997, 2030). While such activities were previously 
stifled by the oppressive Siyad Barre regime, in the absence of central state power, and 
especially in communities where locals have managed to establish a certain level of security 
and order, such small domestic market forces have shown resilience, flexibility, and 
effectiveness in responding to the free market. 
 
A few examples will highlight the entrepreneurial ingenuity and perseverance of local 
Somalis in developing economic order in a stateless state. Somalia is home to over a dozen 
money transfer companies. The largest one is Dahabshiil, based in Hargeisa (Hesse 2010, 
347). International NGOs and multilateral organizations operating in Somalia, as well as local 
Somalis both utilize the services of such money transfer companies, and without them the 
country as a whole would miss out on much of the $500 million - $1 billion a year worth of 
remittances sent from abroad (UNDP 2001, 104-105).4 This “remittance economy” has been 
key to local development in terms of infrastructure, telecommunications, import of consumer 
goods, real-estate investment, and transportation sector investment (Hesse 2010, 347). 
Although Dahabshiil may be based in the more politically and economically stable region of 
Somaliland, it conducts business right across Somalia, and as such provides employment 
opportunities for local Somalis around the country. With the remittance economy being so 
vital to the livelihoods of many Somalis (allowing them to invest in economic activities or 
simply supplement their income), the Hawala system in effect serves as the basis on which the 
                                                 
4 While most scholars writing on Somali remittances quote these UNDP figures, it is important to note that they 
are a decade out of date, and the remittances to Somalia may have grown substantially since 2001. 
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fragmented Somali economy is built. It is only thanks to the perseverance and ingenuity of the 
people of Somalia, and their kinsmen abroad, that economic activity in the country has been 
able to not only survive the collapse of the Somali state, but also flourish in its absence. 
 
Another important aspect of the way in which local Somali communities restore economic 
order and activity in their areas is the traditional Hagbed arrangement. This is basically a 
micro-lending organization formed by 10 to 20 individuals (usually women) (Hesse 2010, 
346). In Hagbed arrangements members are usually drawn from the same clan, community, or 
town; pool together finances by paying weekly contributions into the fund; and use the fund 
for start-up initiatives, or lines of credit for existing business ventures (Ibid.) What is 
important for the success of Hagbed initiatives is that all members lose or gain when a 
borrower stumbles or benefits from a business scheme, and this in turn means that individual 
members are more likely to contribute to the enterprise. This not only builds community spirit 
and solidarity, but also allows people to gain or develop particular skills by learning from 
each other. In a country so severely affected by civil strife, crime, and famine, and plagued by 
lack of economic infrastructure and finance opportunities, Hagbed arrangements offer the 
population a locally owned and controlled scheme for economic activity which can help foster 
local development. In a place where much of the population is displaced, jobless, and devoid 
of opportunities for economic prosperity (save for criminal activities), such community 
funding schemes offer a rare opportunity for people to invest their creative energies and 
labour into something which may give hope in a dignified life, and not mere survival.   
 
5.3 Have Somalis benefitted from a lack of state? 
 
A final point to be examined in discussing the initiatives of local Somalis in developing and 
fostering economic order and activity is whether they may have actually, on the whole, 
benefitted from the demise of Siyad Barre’s regime and the Somali state. In 2007 Peter T. 
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Leeson wrote an article examining the impact of statelessness on Somalia’s development.  
While the traditional idea may be that any form of a state is always better than a stateless 
environment, in the case of Somalia this may not be so. When examining 18 development 
indicators, Leeson found that 14 showed unambiguous improvement under anarchy. He 
argues that 
Life expectancy is higher today than was in the last years of government’s 
existence; infant mortality has improved 24 percent; maternal mortality has fallen 
over 30 percent; infants with low birth weight has fallen more than 15 percentage 
points; access to health facilities has increased more than 25 percentage points; 
access to sanitation has risen eight percentage points; extreme poverty has 
plummeted nearly 20 percentage points; one year olds fully immunized for TB 
has grown nearly 20 percentage points, and for measles has increased ten; 
fatalities due to measles have dropped 30 percent; and the prevalence of TVs, 
radios, and telephones has jumped between 3 and 25 times (2007, 696). 
 
Even the Somali currency appears to have been more stable under anarchy than it was in the 
dying years of the Siyad Barre regime (Ibid., 704). 
 
We may do well to ask how it can be that in a stateless environment rife with civil war, 
political anarchy, and lack of significant economic activity, life could have actually become 
slightly better than during the days of the state?  Well, for one, we should put to rest the myth 
that Somalia has for the past twenty years been a complete apocalyptic anarchy, the kind 
found in “Mad Max” movies. While the first years following the collapse of the Somali state 
in 1991 were indeed anarchic and rife with clan infighting and warlord politics, since the late 
1990s Somalia has actually seen a rise in the development of fluid local polities which 
govern local communities relatively effectively. Add to this a well organized and relatively 
peaceful secessionist state of Somaliland, and a semi-autonomous state of Puntland, and one 
sees that the situation in Somalia is far more complex in terms of local governance, order and 
security, than the international media would have us believe. People have not remained 
passive sufferers of violence and political anarchy, but have devised locally owned initiatives 
in restoring order and security in their communities. Also, post state collapse economic 
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activity in Somalia has actually flourished due to the perseverance, ingenuity, and 
entrepreneurial spirit of the local population, and this has to a large extent influenced the 
positive developmental situation in the country. Finally, another reason why Somalia may be 
better off today than during the days when it had a centralized state is that such a state was so 
predatory and malignant in the last twenty or so years of its existence, that political anarchy 
and statelessness may have actually been less harmful for the Somali people.  
 
5.4. Section conclusion 
 
This chapter began by introducing the idea, supported by relevant literature, that the collapse 
of the Somali state may have actually benefitted the economic activities of the people living 
in Somalia. This was followed by an examination of the “business of trust”, the Hawala 
system, which forms the basis for economic activity in post state collapse Somalia. After the 
collapse of the Siyad Barre regime and all tenets of economic and financial infrastructure in 
the country, the Somali people needed to develop, or revert back to an already familiar 
system of economic activity based on trust. Hawala today forms the basis of most Somali 
business activities, especially those related to the transfer of money within the country and 
from abroad. It is thanks largely to the Hawala system that businesses such as Dahabshiil and 
other money transfer companies have managed to flourish in Somalia, and in turn have 
allowed the country as a whole to develop thanks to a significant remittance economy. 
 
Another system with which Somali people have managed to construct economic order and 
restore economic activities in the stateless country is the Hagbed. This informal micro-
lending arrangement has allowed ordinary Somalis to pool together resources and skills in 
order to fund business startups or draw credit for existing business ventures. In the absence of 
lending agencies, banks, and other financial institutions which would usually contribute to 
such activities, Somalis in southern and central Somalia today have had to develop local 
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community based initiatives which aid in restoring economic activity in the country. 
Naturally, although such economic activity is still very limited and resources are difficult to 
come by, Hagbed arrangements have given Somalis, and especially Somali women, an outlet 
for their creative energy and skills, and allowed them to pursue economic activities which 
benefit the society as a whole. 
 
Finally, this chapter has argued that “anarchy has improved Somali development in important 
ways”, and that, according to several development indicators, Somalis in Somalia have 
actually benefitted from a lack of state, at least as it was in the last decade under Siyad Barre 
(Leeson 2007, 706). 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this project was to examine civil participation initiatives and civil society 
actions undertaken in south and central Somalia with an aim at restoring political order and 
economic activities in local communities. Guided by several working questions which were 
examined and discussed in the preceding chapters, the project sought to answer the research 
question posed in the introduction: 
 
“How do local communities and civil society actors construct and maintain political order, 
governance, and security at the local level in parts of south and central Somalia, and what 
is the basis for economic activity in these areas?” 
 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 provided background against which the analytical discussion was to be 
understood. Chapter 2 outlined a theoretical framework for understanding how Somalia fits 
into the theory of collapsed states, and why it should be considered a collapsed political entity 
which, as a state-like organism, has ceased to exist. The chapter then discussed what civil 
society can constitute, and how this can be applied to non-state actors in Somalia in order to 
understand Somali civil society. 
 
Chapter 3 outlined a political and historical background against which empirical 
contextualization was possible. This chapter briefly examined certain aspects of Siyad Barre’s 
rule and how these aspects and the general repressiveness of his rule contributed to clan 
infighting after he was toppled. 
 
Chapter 4 discussed civil society as a governance structure within south and central Somalia. 
This chapter examined local community initiatives at developing order and maintaining 
security. It was noted that an important role in these initiatives has been played by Sharia 
courts representing structures of local governance, and that these local structures, when united 
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under the banner of the Union of Islamic Courts, were successful in providing security for the 
whole of Mogadishu and much of south and central Somalia, thereby representing a state-like 
structure of governance. This is a clear instance of a civil society initiative growing into a 
regional governance structure. 
 
Chapter 5 examined local systems of operation in the economic sphere which are accepted by 
the majority of the population and have allowed them to undertake economic activities. 
Economic activity in south and central Somalia was not completely ruined by the fall of the 
centralised government and subsequent anarchic reign of Mogadishu’s warlords, but has 
actually survived in a stateless environment. An argument was made that to be able to do 
business, people have had to revert back to a familiar, legitimate, and generally acceptable 
system of economic operation, and that Hawala represents that system. Hawala has allowed 
Somalis abroad and locally to transfer funds internationally, pay for goods and service in the 
country, and extend their economic activities. Also, the role played by local micro-credit 
initiatives has been highly significant in allowing local communities to pool together scarce 
resources and combine skills in establishing entrepreneurial ventures, or financing existing 
ones. Finally, this chapter also discussed whether the collapse of the predatory and oppressive 
Siyad Barre regime may have actually benefitted Somali development. 
 
Throughout the project, the main argument made was that people living in war torn, violent 
and often orderless and predatory areas, are not passive victims to such circumstances, but are 
actually very adept and active in organising themselves and their communities and 
establishing or maintaining some form of order. This has been highlighted with an 
examination of communitarian activities in south and central Somalia, especially Mogadishu. 
This project has argued that while the situation in south and central Somalia is generally 
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dangerous, violent, and anarchic in the sense that there is no trans-local, regional or 
centralised national governance, it is not as chaotic as it may seem. Since the late 1990s at 
least, there has been a rise in fluid, innovative, and locally designed polities and governance 
structures which have come about as a result of civil society activity. These polities exercise 
only local governance, but enjoy a significant level of popularity and legitimacy, and stand in 
stark contrast to internationally-backed top-down initiatives aimed at producing a centralised 
Somali government.  
 
Finally, one can state that in view of the arguments and evidence presented in this project, we 
should reassess the popular version of what Somalia is like (anarchic, apocalyptic, without a 
state and therefore without a hope), and supplant it with a view rooted in actual evidence on 
the ground. Somalia is no doubt still a dangerous place, but the local populations have 
negotiated different ways of successful local governance and order, and this has resulted in a 
significant increase in economic and business activity which drives local development and 
benefits the people in ways foreign aid can not. Somalia today is not politically anarchic, but 
rather home to different forms of local polities which govern local areas with strong support 
from the local populations. It is not an anarchic black hole on the African continent, but a 
politically fragmented troubled area where local communities are doing their best to devise 
local governance structures which restore order in society and foster economic activity. 
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